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Abstract
The subjective Everettian approach to quantum mechanics presented by Deutsch and Wal-
lace fails to constitute an empirically viable theory of quantum phenomena. The decision the-
oretic implementation of the Born rule realized in this approach provides no basis for rejecting
Everettian quantum mechanics in the face of empirical data that contradicts the Born rule. The
approach of Greaves and Myrvold, which provides a subjective implementation of the Born rule
as well but derives it from empirical data rather than decision theoretic arguments, avoids the
problem faced by Deutsch and Wallace and is empirically viable. However, there is good reason
to cast doubts on its scientific value.
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1 Introduction
The last decade of debate with regard to the interpretation of quantum theory has seen the ascen-
dance of a particular variant of the Everettian approach, purported to be free of the problems with
probability that beset its forebears. The essential step in these neo-Everettian approaches comes
from an idea first presented by David Deutsch and then explicated and carried further by David
Wallace. They suggested that a satisfactory Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics could
be based on a purely subjective1 emergence of the probabilistic role of the wave function. According
to this understanding, the connection between the wave function and probabilities does not rely on
any objective characteristics of the many worlds scenario (be it objective probabilities, numbers of
branches or other) but is rather a product of the rational behaviour of agents who find themselves
in one branch of the Everettian universe. Deutsch [1] and later Wallace [2, 3, 4] demonstrated that,
provided that Everettian quantum mechanics was true, the Born rule could be established under
certain conditions as being constitutive of any rational betting behaviour on future outcomes of
quantum experiments.
This Deutsch-Wallace-Everett (DWE) approach to quantum theory has not been without its
critics. One line of critical response found within the literature focuses upon the the structure of
the decision theoretic proof itself, and relies upon either disputing the notion of rationality [5],
or challenging the derivation of the Born rule as a unique/viable subjective probabilistic measure
[6, 7]. Such internal criticisms rest upon implicitly accepting the viability of the DWE framework
but questioning particular aspects of its implementation. Another important line of criticism seeks
to undermine the DWE claim of a derivation Born rule on the basis of a decoherence related
circularity objection [8, 9, 10, 11].
In the present paper, we will not address the question of the internal cogency of the selection
of rationality criteria nor the problems related to the decoherence argument. Rather, we will argue
1Here the use of ‘epistemic’ rather than ‘subjective’ would perhaps be more consistent with the terminology in
use within the philosophy of science. However, we will retain the original terminology to avoid confusion
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that, even if these two points of criticism are disregarded, the Deutsch-Wallace-Everett programme
is afflicted by a further exogenous malady owing to a failure to fulfil an essential condition for being
a satisfactory scientific approach: We will claim that the DWE scheme is fundamentally flawed
since it does not offer a basis for rejecting Everettian quantum mechanics in the face of evidence
that contradicts the predictions of quantum mechanics.
We begin in Section §2 by briefly outlining the key conceptual steps taken within the DWE
approach towards quantum mechanics. This programme is then, in Section §3, shown to fail to
be empirically viable according to our definition. In §4 we consider a strategy that has been
proposed to deal with the issue of predictions/evidence by Greaves and Myvold [12]. They believe
we should explicitly ascribe (non-probabilistic) primitive weights to branches according to the Born
rule and then base this branch weighting rule upon the empirical evidence we have hitherto taken
to refer to probabilities. We will point out that this strategy departs from DWE in precisely the
respect that any Everettian is at pains to avoid: it introduces a new rule in order to provide an
interpretation of the wave function. Furthermore, it will be argued that this additional structure
is of questionable scientific value, and thus that the Greaves-Myvold approach constitutes a rather
unattractive interpretational option.
2 The Deutsch Wallace Approach
Let us briefly consider the line of reasoning presented by Deutsch and Wallace. Their starting
point is a core problem of the Everettian approach. Consider an agent who carries out a quantum
experiment that can have a number of different outcomes. Everettian QM relates each outcome
to one branch of the Everettian universe. Since an actual instantiation of our agent exists in each
of those branches, the agent’s chances of finding themselves in one specific branch after the ex-
periment might be expected to be directly determined by the number of branches which fork off
from the initial state of the experiment. Closer analysis shows, however, that such branch counting
– in conjunction with the Everettian understanding that the branches emerge based on decoher-
ence without additional assumptions – cannot coherently reproduce the probabilities provided by
quantum mechanics. (See e.g. [13]).
The Deutsch-Wallace strategy [1, 2, 3, 4] is to deal with this problem by deploying a double
strategy. First, they argue that it is impossible in principle to extract probability statements on
the outcomes of quantum experiments on the basis of branch counting. Since decoherence is fuzzy
in the sense that there is no precise way of telling at what point in time decoherence occurs, it
is impossible to specify one definitive branching structure for a quantum process.2 This in turn
implies that no definitive probabilistic conclusions can be drawn from branch counting. The DWE
approach is then based upon the conclusion that quantum probabilities cannot be implemented
at an objective level in an Everettian framework at all. The many worlds structure thus must
not be understood in terms of a discrete set of branches where the probability for measuring a
2We will in this paper neglect the issues inherent within any Everettian invocation of a decoherence based ontology.
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specific result in a quantum experiment can be extracted from the number of alternative branches
which fork off during the experiment. Under the DWE approach it is then claimed that, once the
connection between measurement probabilities and the branching structure is broken, the problem
of conceptual incompatibility between the two is thereby dissolved.
It remains to be shown how measurement probabilities are related to Everettian QM at all.
In a second step, the DWE approach leads us to implement probabilities at a subjective level by
introducing a decision theoretic analysis. We ask the question as to which rational betting strategies
are open to an agent living in a branch of the Everettian world; and then postulate rationality
criteria which are taken to be necessary for coherent reasoning. On that basis, the claim is that one
can show that, up to linear transformations, applying the Born rule to the amplitudes provided by
quantum mechanics constitutes the only rational betting strategy if one is convinced that Everettian
QM is true.3 The viability of Everettian quantum mechanics as an adequate description of nature
thus is claimed to follow from the rationality restriction on our betting behaviour.
The implementation of the decision theoretic argument within the DWE scheme has the follow-
ing form:
A1: The Everettian perspective on quantum mechanics amounts to nothing more than liter-
ally accepting the equations of quantum mechanics (which, in of themselves, do not imply the
probabilistic implementation of quantum mechanics based on the Born rule).
A2: For an agent who understands themselves as part of an Everettian universe, the Born
rule constitutes the only possible basis for rational betting on the outcome of quantum processes.
If Everettian QM is true, a rational scientist thus should apply the Born rule as a probabilistic
measure for possible experimental outcomes.
⇒ C1 Everettian QM predicts that outcomes of quantum experiments adhere to the Born rule.
O: The predictions which can be extracted from Everettian QM by deploying the Born rule are
empirically confirmed by all availlable data.
⇒ C2: Everettian QM must be taken to be a viable description of quantum phenomena at this
point.
In the following, we take observation O for granted and, for the sake of the argument, concede
assumptions A1 and A2. We will argue on that basis that the Deutsch-Wallace argument is
fallacious and leads to a misrepresentation of the actual status of Everettian QM. The crux of the
DWE argument lies in C1. As we will see, calling the fact that rationality enforces a specific betting
behaviour a prediction is highly misleading since it does not accord with the standard meaning of
scientific prediction and is too weak for establishing a scientific theory’s empirical viability.
3As noted above many questions have been raised with regard to the cogency of the rationality criteria chosen.
We will not add to the already substantial literature in this line.
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3 The Problem of Empirical Viability
To understand the problem faced by the Deutsch-Wallace approach, we must be clear about the
role Everettian QM is supposed to play. Considering the currently available data, the canonical
interpretation of quantum mechanics (henceforth called QM) provides an empirically fully viable
basis for calculating non-relativistic quantum phenomena. The conceptual difficulties of QM do
not amount to empirical deficits. Therefore, we expect Everettian QM to resolve the conceptual
difficulties of QM while retaining the empirically confirmed implications of QM. If Everettian QM
fulfils that condition, we can call it empirically viable with respect to the current empirical status
quo. We know, however, that Everettian QM is not fully empirically equivalent with QM since it
allows for recoherence effects which are absent in QM. [14] In order to check the empirical viability
of Everettian QM we thus have to demand empirical equivalence with respect to the available
data while allowing for empirical differences with respect to data that lies beyond the range of the
experiments carried out up to this point. In other words, we must require that Everettian QM
meets the standard of empirical viability set by QM with respect to the experiments carried out up
to this point.
In the following, we will analyse whether or not Everettian QM as understood by Deutsch and
Wallace can be called an empirically viable theory in the described sense. To that end, let us
further specify the conditions which have to be fulfilled in order to acknowledge that a scheme S
meets the standard of empirical viability set by some theory T. We can immediately state a simple
condition that is necessary without any doubt:
I1: A scheme S meets the standard of empirical viability set by a theory T only if S is not
refuted by the collected empirical data that confirms T.
This condition seems fulfilled by the Deutsch-Wallace-Everett (DWE) approach to quantum
mechanics. Given that recoherence effects are too small for being observable in present day exper-
iments, Everettian QM does not contain any empirical implications at variance with QM that can
be contradicted by the available empirical data. Thus so far as I1 goes DWE has no problems.
However, a simple example can show that this condition fails to exclude all classes of theories that
are obviously not empirically viable.
Let us consider Newtonian mechanics and compare it to a scheme SN that assumes that objects
move freely in space without following any deterministic or probabilistic equations of motion.
According to I1, we could say that this theory meets the standard of empirical viability set by
Newtonian mechanics. After all, since SN gives no predictions regarding the movements of objects
at all, it cannot offer any predictions which contradict Newtonian mechanics. It is obviously absurd,
however, to say that SN meets the standard of empirical viability set by Newtonian physics, and
there is a clear reason why: if objects were found to move in space in disagreement with Newton’s
laws, that would contradict Newtonian physics but would not contradict SN. Therefore, we clearly
can distinguish empirically between the two schemes and must call Newtonian mechanics the by
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far stronger theory.
In order to exclude examples like the one presented above, we thus need one more condition. A
very plausible choice is:
I2: A scheme S meets the standard of empirical viability set by a theory T only if any data
that could have been collected in experiments which have been carried out in the past and would
have refuted theory T would also have refuted S.
The question is then whether or not the DWE approach to quantum mechanics satisfies I2.
As has been noted in the literature (see e.g. [11]), the DWE approach does not give us an
objective basis for predicting the results of quantum measurements. Any outcome of a quantum
process that does not contradict non-statistical laws is represented by a branch in the many worlds
structure – and since all branches in a many worlds scenario are taken to be real, no objective
selections of individual branches take place. Furthermore, as we have seen above, proponents of
the DWE approach explicitly emphasise that no probabilities of measurement outcomes can be
extracted from branch counting. Therefore, every pattern of outcomes of a quantum experiment
that is not strictly forbidden by the laws of quantum mechanics is equally consistent with the DWE
scheme at an objective level.
Proponents of the DWE scheme assert, however, that their approach to quantum mechanics
implies the use of the Born rule in bets on empirical outcomes since no other betting behaviour
is rational. This subjective implementation of quantum probability in some sense amounts to the
claim that the Everettian approach makes roughly the same predictions about the outcome of
quantum experiments as QM. In Chapter 6 of his book [4], David Wallace explicitly asserts that
the ‘predictions’ of DWE provide the basis for falsifying Everettian QM in the face of evidence that
contradicts them. In his terms, Wallace claims that DWE has an answer to the ‘unknown theory
problem’. In the following, we shall argue that this assertion is mistaken.
Let us imagine that recent quantum experiments had provided empirical data that were signif-
icantly incompatible with the statistical predictions of QM. By this we mean experimental results
which did not violate the non-probabilistic laws of quantum mechanics but which were assigned
a vanishingly small probability by the theory. A consistent (and diverse) sequence of such exper-
imental results would eventually have lead the scientific community to accept that QM had been
refuted.
How would the DWE scheme have been affected by the described empirical evidence? In
principle, one could hope to implement falsification at two levels.
First, one might think that the collected data falsified the claim that one should use the Born
rule in Everettian quantum mechanics. This does not work, however, since the decision theoretic
argument for the Born rule does not rely on empirical data at all. The finding that the application
of the Born rule constitutes the only basis for rational betting within the DWE scheme relies solely
on the decision theoretic analysis. It gets its strength from the claim that we can derive it based
on the assumption of cogent and more or less indubitable general principles of rationality. If we
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took those principles as being empirically refuted as soon as the first scientific anomaly has been
derived on their basis, they would be utterly useless. If we don’t want to abandon the posited
rationality principles and thereby the entire subjectivist approach from the start, we must uphold
those principles even in the face of false predictions made on their basis in the context of some
scientific theory.
Second, one could hope to find falsification with respect to structural elements of Everettian
QM itself. But this would lead us back to an analysis of the objective structure of Everettian QM.
We know already that the DWE scheme does not provide objective probabilities for outcomes of
experiments and therefore cannot be refuted by experimental data on that basis (provided that
data is not strictly forbidden by the laws of quantum mechanics). We thus have no basis for the
claim that structural elements of Everettian QM are falsified by the given data either. We must
conclude that the considered data do not falsify Everettian QM at all.
At first sight, it may seem paradox that DWE ‘predicts’ data but empirical results which con-
tradict those predictions do not falsify the theory. The situation becomes clear once one compares
conventional predictions with ‘predictions’ as deployed in DWE based on a reconstruction in terms
of hypothetico-deductivism. In conventional cases, the (statistical distribution of) empirical data
to be found in experiments can be deduced from the theory. A contradiction between predicted and
observed data thus implies that either the statement specifying the collected data or the theory is
false. DWE, to the contrary, only asserts that statements about the rationality of betting behaviour
can be deduced from Everettian QM. No deductive step is available that leads from the statement
that only betting on a specific statistical data distribution is rational to the statement that this
distribution will in fact be found in experiments. Therefore, the observation of contradicting data
does not imply that either the theory or the statement about observed data is false. No falsification
can occur.
In order to characterise the kind of fallacy involved in DWE reasoning, let us look at a toy
example that has nothing to do with quantum physics. Let us assume a slightly modified form of
Pascal’s wager. Imagine that man has studied religion quite a lot and came up with the following
heaven-theory: if there is life after death, the one who bets on it before death will get a million
Pounds start capital in afterlife (heaven seems to be British) while the one who bets against it will
get just one Pound. (Agnostics get nothing.) However, the chances that afterlife exists are just
one over a million. The only rational betting behaviour in this case is betting on the existence of
afterlife. Still, once the voice of god at the time of death tells you: ‘sorry, no afterlife’, your last
thought should not be: ‘So heaven-theory was false.’ It should rather be: ‘Given heaven-theory, I’m
not surprised. After all, there is no logical implication that leads from the specification of rational
betting behaviour to factual statements on the subject of betting.’
DWE thus gives us no justification at all for withdrawing the predictions according to the Born
rule in the face of data that disagrees with the Born rule. The objective implications of DWE do
not involve the Born rule and thus cannot be at variance with the new data; and the predictions
extracted at the subjective level which do involve the Born rule are not based on empirical data
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and therefore cannot be refuted by it. We thus must conclude that DWE would not have been
refuted by a large class of data that would have refuted QM. The form of prediction provided by
DWE does not amount to scientific prediction as defined by refutability by data that is at variance
with the prediction. DWE thus does not meet the standard of scientific viability set by QM.
The defender of DWE might try to rescue the general DWE scheme by making a minor amend-
ment. They might introduce an additional rationality principle P that consists in the requirement
that bets on future outcomes may only be placed as long as they do not stand in conflict with
predictions based on cogent inductive reasoning. Once principle P is added, the defender of DWE
might argue, bets according to the Born rule are not rational any more in the presence of signifi-
cant empirical deviations from QM. The viability of the DWE predictions thus can be refuted by
empirical data after all.
But rather than solving the problem, this step shows the precarious character of the decision
theoretic argument even more clearly. Let us assume that recent quantum experiments showed a
specific pattern of deviations from QM predictions. To have a nice simple example, let us imagine
that quantum experiments for many months went according to the Born rule all day except for
the hour after midnight, when all quantum outcomes gave those results which carried the highest
Born weights. The extended rationality conditions would imply that there is no rational betting
behaviour in the hour after midnight: the only rational option based on the DWE rationality
conditions would be betting according to the Born rule; but principle P renders this strategy
rationally excluded in the given case.
Any agent who followed basic principles of scientific reasoning and had the slightest experience
in betting, however, would judge the observed pattern of incoming data based on the available
background information and then know how to bet accordingly. Agents believing in Everettian
QM in particular would adhere to the following line of reasoning: Everettian QM does not make
objective predictions which contradict the observed pattern of data; on these grounds there is
no reason for being less convinced of Everettian QM after the data than before; the data allows
for immediate inductive predictions concerning the outcomes of future experiments during the
hour after midnight; therefore, one should bet accordingly. Abstaining from this strategy would
contradict the principle of inductive reasoning and therefore would be at variance with scientific
thinking. In other words, the DWE rationality principles are incompatible with scientific thinking
and therefore cannot be accepted as a foundation of scientific reasoning. Betting must always
be carried out according to inductive reasoning. As long as that strategy is consistent with the
DWE principles of rationality, the latter can be upheld. As soon as it differs from them, the DWE
principles can only be defended at the price of abandoning scientifically implied forms of reasoning.
To conclude, the subjectivist approach of DWE does not make Everettian quantum mechanics a
viable description of our world. Its failure in that respect can be stated in two different ways. First,
if one endorses the rationality principles stated by DWE as universally valid, the DWE approach
to Everettian QM does not meet the standards of empirical viability set by QM. And second, if
one understands the principle of inductive reasoning as a core element of rationality, the rationality
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principles suggested by DWE become irrelevant because they can only be upheld as long as the
betting strategy they imply is being enforced anyway by the principle of inductive inference.
4 Branches, Weights, and Evidence
4.1 The Greaves-Myrvold approach
The final argument of Section §3 has demonstrated that DWE does not provide a satisfactory
mechanism of confronting Everettian QM with empirical evidence. In this section we will consider
an approach towards subjectivist Everettian QM that is specifically designed to address the problem
of empirical evidence. This approach, due to Greaves and Myrvold [12] shares with the DWE scheme
the understanding that the statistical character of quantum mechanics cannot be established at an
objective level but at the same time accepts the need to infer the Born rule from empirical data.4
To that end, Greaves and Myrvold, use a decision theoretic argument very much in the style of
Deutsch and Wallace, but within a different context: that of theory confirmation by empirical
evidence.
Greaves and Myrvold emphasise that quantum physicists must at any rate account for the
observed statistical pattern of quantum measurements and, as scientists, must inductively apply
that information in order to predict future outcomes. (Thereby, they acknowledge the additional
‘rationality principle’ formulated at the end of Section §3.) On that basis, quantum physicists
observe that the relative frequency data they collect are in agreement with the Born rule and
therefore accept that rule. Greaves and Myrvold argue that the adoption of the Born rule should
be motivated by the Everettian on the described evidential basis and be implemented within the
framework of an Everettian branching structure by attributing weights between 0 and 1 to individual
branches accordingly. These weights correspond to the predicted probabilities of measurement
outcomes but do not constitute probabilities themselves. Rather, they just serve as primitive
indicators of quantitative predictions. Thus, the Greaves-Myrvold strategy involves the substitution
for – rather than explanation of – the usual connection between observed evidence and probabilistic
dynamical structure. The claim is that:
[An] agent will regard relative frequency data from repeated experiments as infor-
mative about values of branch weights in exactly the same way that, on the usual view,
they are informative about chances of outcomes. (p.7)
and that:
[G]iven reasonable constraints on an epistemic agent’s preference between wagers,
she will act as if she believes that there are physical branch weights, analogous to
physical chances, that can be estimated empirically in the same way that chances are,
4The reader is referred to [15] for an interesting precursor to the Greaves and Myrvold analysis. The difference
between that approach and the later treatment considered here are not significant for our purposes.
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and that observation of events to which a theory assigns high branch weight boosts
rational credence in a branching theory in the same way that observation of events to
which a theory assigns high chance boosts rational credence in a chance theory. (p.28)
The approach is subjectivist because it does not provide an interpretation of the branch weights
within the context of the objective Everettian branching structure. The branch weights only acquire
meaning with respect to an individual agent in an individual branch, where they denote the agent’s
probabilistic expectations qua betting behaviour. Significantly, the probabilistic expectations of the
agent are not understood as being in any way connected to the occurrence or not of the relevant
outcomes since, as in any Everettian style picture, all outcomes will occur. This means that, as
noted by Albert [16], under the Greaves-Myrvold analysis, ‘the business of deciding how to bet is
just a matter of maximising the payoffs on those branches that I happen to care most about’ and
has ‘nothing whatsoever to do with guessing at whether or not [an event] is going to occur’ (p.364)
[italics in the original]. This facet of the approach is certainly unusual – customarily we would
expect any account of scientific theory confirmation to be based upon the theories ability to make
reliable predictions of the occurrence of events rather than robust guidelines to branch weight based
betting. However, it would be unfair to see this crucial shift as an underhand move: as seen from
the quotes above Greaves and Myrolvd are at pains to be explicit about their radical departure
from our usual notion of confirmation – and it surely is not legitimate to simply reject the scheme
simply on the grounds of its strangeness. Nevertheless, questions as to whether or not Greaves and
Myrvold have stretched the concepts of betting and evidence too far past the customary meanings
to remain viable, certainly constitute a valid line of objection – and in this sense there is certainly
a case to answer in the face of the (rather trenchant) criticisms of Albert [16]. For discussion of
such issues as well as possible adaptations of Greaves-Myrvold scheme in the face of them, see [17].
However, for the purpose of this paper – and in continuity with our discussion of DWE above – we
will concede the internal conceptual coherence of the scheme in order to focus upon external issues;
in particular the legitimacy of the Greaves-Myrvold approach within the Everettian family.
4.2 Empirically viable but no longer viably Everettian
Greaves and Myrvold take their approach to be consistent with DWE, and envisage their work as
a supplement to that of Deutsch and Wallace which provides a framework for theory confirmation
in a branching (although not necessarily Everettian) universe. This understanding is in agreement
with Wallace’s own perspective, who points out at the end of Chapter 4 in [4] that the decision
theoretic argument may be seen as a more thorough explanation of the validity of the Born rule,
which could in principle also be inferred from the collected data based on inductive reasoning.
However, as was demonstrated in Section §3 of this paper, the rationality criteria suggested by
DWE cannot be reconciled with a full commitment to inductive reasoning. Inversely, an agent
deliberating within the framework of Greaves and Myrvold can not simultaneously operate within
the framework of DWE. Let us therefore proceed to investigate how the Greeves-Myrvold approach
fares as an alternative approach to Everettian QM in its own right.
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Significantly for our purposes, the account of Greaves and Myrvold would appear to have a
substantial empirical advantage over the DWE approach. According to Greaves and Myrvold the
overall scheme that should be held by the quantum physicist is constituted by the objectively stated
structure of Everettian QM in conjunction with the empirically established attribution of branch
weights according to the Born rule. That overall scheme is empirically indistinguishable from QM
with respect to the currently available data. Moreover, data that deviated significantly from the
Born rule would have refuted the Greaves-Myrvold scheme in the same way as it would have refuted
QM. In this sense, Greaves and Myrvold, unlike Deutsch and Wallace, have managed to formulate
a theory that meets the standard of empirical viability set by QM. They have done so, however, at
a very high cost. Let us take one step back to put the move by Greaves and Myrvold into context.
Everettian QM was originally proposed in order to keep the equations of quantum mechanics
free from additional principles which established the relation between the wave function and the
stochastic character of empirical data - and its modern defenders take this feature to be one of
its principal strengths. Canonical ‘Copenhagen’ QM introduces the collapse of the wave function
and then relates the statistics of empirical data to the stochastic characteristics of the collapse.
Bohmian QM introduces (non-local) hidden parameters and relates the statistics of empirical data
to the initial conditions of particles. Through the Everettian approach, it is claimed that quantum
mechanics can do without any additions. The statistics of empirical data should follow just from the
pure unitary dynamics of the wave function. This central Everettian claim thus is a very significant
one and, if vindicated, would constitute a clear strengthening of the status of quantum mechanics.
As we have seen, however, a straightforward deduction of the Born rule from the dynamics of the
wave function has turned out not to be achievable in the context of a many worlds type approach.
It is for this reason Deutsch and Wallace made the step from the objective to the subjective level.
They said: even if we cannot deduce the Born rule from what Everettians take to be the objective
many worlds structure of the universe, we can show that applying the Born rule is not a contingent
choice for an agent in one of the branches of the universe. It is the only rational strategy available
and therefore does not have to be derived at an objective structural level. Deutsch and Wallace
therefore retain the strength of Everettian QM as an approach that does not introduce any physical
posits beyond the equations of quantum mechanics. We have seen in the previous section, however,
that this approach fails because, in the end, it does not lead to an empirically viable theory.
Greaves and Myrvold suggest that we just take into account the empirical data and establish the
Born rule on that basis subjectively. In doing so, however, they surrender a core claim of Everettian
QM: that we can deduce the full phenomenology from the dynamics of the wave function without
any additional assumptions. For their scheme to work, Greaves and Myrvold must make the addi-
tional assumption that our observations in quantum physics are in accordance with Born weights
attributed to branches. The introduction of this assumption unquestionably amounts to supple-
menting the bare formalism with additional structure and thus a failure to retain the prima facie
most attractive feature of Everettian quantum mechanics. Under Greaves and Myrvold’s approach,
the equations of quantum mechanics can no longer be claimed to yield their own interpretation.
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Furthermore, explanatorily the additional structure they introduce is remarkably uninteresting.
Whereas, for example, in dynamical collapse or Bohemian models, additional structure is introduced
such that a plausible basis for the statistical characteristics of our observations is rooted in the
structural characteristics of quantum mechanics, Greaves and Myrvold merely introduce a module
that is entirely phenomenal in character and stays independent of all objective structural aspects
of the theory. The phenomenal implications of this module could in fact be tuned at will in order
to fit the empirical data without affecting our understanding of the theory’s objective structure. If
an agent observed a different statistics than the one implied by the Born rule, then they could fix
the weights accordingly and thus establish that statistics as a rule; if they observed no discernible
statistical pattern at all, then they could conclude that the weights do not follow any discernable
pattern and thus refrain from predicting anything – all without changing the meaning of any
objective structural properties of Everettian QM. Greaves and Myrvold in effect say: we just don’t
know why the Born rule applies, so let us simply take it as a primitive fact that it does. Given
that most of what is empirically interesting about quantum mechanics is related to the Born rule,
this amounts to a capitulation. In order to make the subjectivist approach sensitive to empirical
data, Greaves and Myrvold deem it necessary to turn it into an empty shell.
This point can be illustrated by means of a simple example from classical statistical physics.
Consider an ideal gas at a moderate temperature and close to thermal equilibrium; and consider
an idealised experiment where the velocities of individual gas molecules are measured. Given a
certain limited degree of accuracy, such measurements would lead to the empirical observation that
the molecules obey a certain probability distribution – i.e. the Maxwell-Botzmann distribution for
the given temperature. The standard classical mechanical description of such a system according
to kinetic theory would provide an account of the observed distribution in terms of structural
features of the theory itself – i.e. the particular statistical distribution observed is rooted in the
theoretical framework used. Observation of a statistical distribution add odds with that of Maxwell
and Boltzmann would constitute a refutation of kinetic gas theory.
Let us then consider a scheme SKT which consists of certain of the principal assumptions of ki-
netic theory but does not have sufficient theoretical structure to derive the full statistical predictions
of the theory (Newton’s force law is missing for example!). Now, let us allow for SKT to contain
a Maxwell-Botzmann ‘phenomenological module’ – analogous to the Born ‘phenomenological mod-
ule’ that Greaves and Myrvold attached to Everettian theory – such that we taken into account
the relevant observed empirical data in order to establish the Maxwell-Botzmann subjectively as
a belief enforced by rationality constraints upon an inductive scientist. In such circumstances one
would be able to successful predict the behaviour of the system based upon SKT just as if it were
a substantive physical theory. Moreover, by our criteria I2, SKT would meet the standard of em-
pirical viability set by kinetic theory since any data that could have been collected in experiments
which have been carried out in the past and would have refuted kinetic theory would also have
refuted SKT.5 However, clearly SKT is of almost no scientific value precisely because – as in the
5Refutation of a theory in the given statistical context means that the probability that the observed data pattern
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Greaves-Myrvold case – it relies upon a phenomenological module that is entirely independent of
all objective structural aspects of kinetic theory and could in fact be tuned at will in order to fit
the empirical data without affecting our understanding of the theory’s objective structure.
Of course, the Geaves-Myrvold approach to quantum theory differs from the SKT approach
to kinetic theory by constituting a response to a specific interpretational problem. However, the
essential features of both schemes are the same: the statistical predictions are established based
upon an inductive ‘module’ rather than integrated theoretical structure. Although such strategies
may be both coherent and by our lights empirically viable, as contributions to our understanding
of the world they are almost entirely without merit; and improving our understanding of the world
arguably is what interpretations of quantum mechanics should be aiming at.
5 Conclusion
The Deutsch-Wallace-Everett approach fails to provide an empirically viable form of quantum
mechanics. Everettian QM based on a subjective implementation of the Born rule as suggested
by Deutsch and Wallace would be empirically refutable to a far lesser degree than QM per se.
Moreover, the rationality conditions introduced by Deutsch and Wallace would be at variance with
scientific reasoning when confronted with data that violates QM by being at variance with the Born
rule.
Unlike the DWE-scheme, the approach of Greaves and Myrvold, which relies on extracting
the Born rule at a subjective level from empirical data rather than from rationality principles, is
capable of providing an empirically viable form of quantum mechanics. This approach, however,
jettisons much of what is interesting about interpretations of QM in general (it does not offer
any deeper level explanation of the Born rule at all) and about Everettian QM in particular (it
gives up the Everettian aim to avoid additional physical posits beyond the equations of quantum
mechanics). Thus, the Greaves-Myrvold approach does not look like a promising step towards a
deeper understanding of quantum physics.
The described dilemma between loosing predictive power in the decision theoretical framework
on the one hand, and deploying inductive reasoning in a primitive form without deeper entrench-
ment within the conceptual principles of quantum mechanics on the other, seems to be unavoidable
once a subjectivist approach towards Everettian quantum physics has been chosen. Anchoring part
of the predictive power of the theory at the subjective level isolates that part from the theory’s
objective structure and therefore blocks all chances of relating the corresponding results of induc-
tive inference to that structure. Decision theoretic arguments, however, are not data-based and
therefore cannot replace inductive reasoning as a basis for empirically testable scientific predictions.
In our understanding, the described dilemma suggests that, to the extent the Everettian approach
is generated by the theory in question lies below a specified very small value. In high energy physics, to give an
example, a theory counts as refuted if it disagrees with the data at 5σ confidence level.
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may be seen as promising, its future fertility is likely to be found at the level of objective Everettian
structure.
References
[1] D. Deutsch, “Quantum theory of probability and decisions,” Proceedings of the Royal Society
of London. Series A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 455 no. 1988, (1999)
3129–3137,
http://rspa.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/455/1988/3129.full.pdf+html.
http://rspa.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/455/1988/3129.abstract.
[2] D. Wallace, “Quantum Probability from Subjective Likelihood: improving on Deutsch’s
proof of the probability rule,” Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies
In History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 no. 2, (2007) 311–332.
[3] D. Wallace, “A formal proof of the born rule from decision-theoretic assumptions,” ArXiv
e-prints http://arxiv.org/abs/0906.2718v1 (2009) , 0906.2718v1.
http://arxiv.org/abs/0906.2718v1.
[4] D. Wallace, The Emergent Multiverse. Oxford Univeristy Press, 2012.
[5] H. Price, “Decisions, Decisions, Decisions: Can Savage Salvage Everettian Probability?,” in
Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality, S. Saunders, J. Barrett, A. Kent, and
D. Wallace, eds., pp. 369–391. Oxford Univeristy Press, 2010.
[6] P. Lewis, “Uncertainty and probability for branching selves,” Studies In History and
Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies In History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38
no. 1, (2006) 1/14.
[7] M. Hemmo and I. Pitowsky, “Quantum probability and many worlds,” Studies In History
and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies In History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38
(2007) 333–350.
[8] W. H. Zurek, “Probabilities from entanglement, Born’s rule pk =| ψk |2 from envariance,”
Phys. Rev. A 71 (May, 2005) 052105.
http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevA.71.052105.
[9] W. H. Zurek, “Quantum jumps, Born’s rule, and objective reality,” in Many Worlds?
Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality, S. Saunders, J. Barrett, A. Kent, and D. Wallace,
eds., ch. 13, pp. 409–432. Oxford Univeristy Press, 2010.
[10] D. J. Baker, “Measurement outcomes and probability in everettian quantum mechanics,”
Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies In History and Philosophy of
14
Modern Physics 38 no. 1, (2007) 153 – 169.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1355219806000694.
[11] A. Kent, “One world versus many: The inadequacy of Everettian accounts of evolution,
probability, and scientific confirmation,” in Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory, and
Reality, S. Saunders, J. Barrett, D. Wallace, and A. Kent, eds., ch. 10, pp. 307–355. Oxford
Univeristy Press, 2010. http:
//www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/6510144/2010/00000001/00000001/art00016.
[12] H. Greaves and W. Myrvold, “Everett and evidence,” in Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum
Theory, and Reality, S. Saunders, J. Barrett, A. Kent, and D. Wallace, eds., ch. 9,
pp. 264–304. Oxford Univeristy Press, 2010.
[13] A. I. Rae, “Everett and the Born rule,” Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part B:
Studies In History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 40 no. 3, (2009) 243 – 250.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1355219809000306.
[14] J. A. Barrett, “On the faithful interpretation of pure wave mechanics.,” The British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science 62 no. 4, (2011) 99–123.
[15] H. Greaves, “On the everettian epistemic problem,” Studies In History and Philosophy of
Science Part B: Studies In History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 no. 1, (2007)
120–152.
[16] D. Albert, “Probablity in the everett picture,” in Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory,
and Reality, S. Saunders, J. Barrett, D. Wallace, and A. Kent, eds., ch. 11, pp. 354–368.
Oxford Univeristy Press, 2010. http:
//www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/6510144/2010/00000001/00000001/art00016.
[17] P. Tappenden, “Evidence and uncertainty in everett’s multiverse,” The British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science 62 no. 4, (2011) 693–709.
15
